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1. Introduction 
Most contemporary observers of international investment law will likely share 
with the author of these lines the impression that the criticism expressed by many 
commentators over the last decade with respect to the operation of investor-State 
arbitration is no longer of merely theoretical interest. 1  Practice, broadly 
understood so as to encompass more circumspect stances taken by arbitration 
tribunals, more carefully reflected treaty negotiation and design, and even the 																																																								
∗  Harold Samuel Chair, University of Cambridge, and Of Counsel with Lalive (Geneva). The manuscript of this 
article was submitted on 12 July 2016 and later revised and resubmitted on 26 October 2016. It takes into 
account developments until the latter date. All views expressed in this article in my strict academic capacity. 
1  See, among several others, Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni, Ernst-Ullrich Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009); Claire Balchin, Liz Kyo-Hwa 
Chung, Asha Kaushal and Michael Waibel (eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Boston: 
Kluwer, 2010); Jorge E. Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law of Foreign Investment 
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Jorge E. Viñuales, ‘Investor diligence in investment arbitration: Sources and arguments’ (2017) 32(3) ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, forthcoming 2017. 
 	
wide variety of events, discussions and writings through which a certain idea of 
the state of investment arbitration is formed, is indeed changing. And the drivers 
are not confined to stigmatised countries (and authors) but also include an 
increasing number of developed countries and even the European Commission. In 
academic and practitioner circles, the initial polarisation between pro-investor and 
pro-State views is no longer a useful discourse, if it ever was. This is not – and 
should not be – the time to point fingers at people for rapacious or hypocritical 
practices or to do entirely away with a system of investment arbitration that, 
despite its many flaws, has also many advantages. Rather, the time is ripe to 
formulate specific suggestions as to how to adjust the international legal 
framework relating to investment transactions. It is in this context that the concept 
of investor diligence in investment arbitration is starting to be discussed in more 
detail, not just as a matter of activism but as one of law, positive law.  
Requiring a certain level of diligence from foreign investors is not a new 
idea. For decades, there have been initiatives to subject multinational enterprises 
and financial institutions to some standards of conduct, giving rise to the vast 
body of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR)2 and ‘Socially Responsible 
Investment’ (SRI)3 standards. What is more recent is the attempt at fleshing out 
such diligence in legal terms and, more specifically, in the context of foreign 
investment disputes decided by arbitral tribunals.  
In this context, this article has one simple goal. It seeks to conceptualise the 
main sources of investor diligence or, in other words, of ways of defining 
standards and making them operate legally in an investment arbitration context.  I 
identify three approaches, namely (i) the usual soft-law standards addressed 
directly to companies (CSR) or indirectly to financial institutions (SRI), (ii) legal 
anchors that make standards actionable and enforceable as well as other forms of 
international obligations imposed on investors, and (iii) more prosaically, the 
limitation of the scope of investment protection provisions with legal 
consequences for the jurisdictional, admissibility, merits and quantum phases of 
investment proceedings. Each approach is analysed in turn by reference to some 
prominent examples. The article concludes with some observations regarding the 
conceptual as well as very practical implications of mainstreaming investor 
diligence in investment arbitration.  
My hope in bringing these different approaches to bear at once on the 
question of investor diligence is that their articulation may appear more clearly. 
The wealth of standards governing the behaviour of investors (CSR, SRI and 
others) can be legally anchored through certain techniques (e.g. enhanced 
voluntary standards, compliance requirements, formal international obligations on 
investors, or treaty clauses referring to CSR). These duties can in turn operate in 
an investment dispute by virtue of several legal concepts intervening at different 																																																								
2  See Jennifer Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
3  See Benjamin Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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stages of investment proceedings: jurisdiction (illegality arguments); admissibility 
(illegality arguments, unclean hands doctrine, and transnational public policy); 
merits/liability (causation, contributory fault, making expectations unreasonable 
or providing the basis for a counterclaim); and quantum (causation/contributory 
fault or the duty to mitigate damages). 
2. Sources of investor diligence4 
2.1. Sources as analytical vantage points 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the sources of investor diligence, some 
additional comments on what this term encompasses appear useful. Often, 
lawyers refer to the source of a norm as the place where the norm is ‘found’ or has 
been formulated (the locus of the norm). From this basic perspective, the sources 
of investor diligence are all those instruments, whether binding or not, 
international or domestic, top-down (regulation) or bottom-up (self-regulation), 
direct or indirect, where one can find norms or standards of behaviour addressed 
to investors.  
A second meaning of the term is more technical and refers to the legal 
grounding of a given norm. In international law, we use the term ‘formal source’ 
to specify whether a norm is ‘law’ as a result of its treaty or customary nature and, 
less frequently, of its constituting a general principle of law. In the context of this 
article, this meaning is relevant to understand whether a given norm or standard of 
behaviour is binding or not. This raises profound questions of theory that I can 
only mention in passing here. One is the extent to which formal sources of law not 
recognised as such in international law (as is the case of domestic law, which is 
often viewed as facts) can nevertheless provide the basis for an international 
obligation imposed directly on investors (e.g. through incorporation by an 
applicable law clause). Another one is whether an entity which is not clearly 
acknowledged as a subject of international law can have binding obligations under 
international law (grounded in one formal source). Whereas the latter question is 
circular and could be expressly solved (an entity that has obligations directly 
imposed by international law – e.g. individuals have the obligation not to commit 
certain international crimes – has some measure of international subjectivity), the 
former is in practice left unaddressed or handled through a choice-of-law (e.g. 
Article 42 of the ICSID Convention) or some other ‘anchor’ clause that 
incorporates domestic law or some other instrument.5  
A third way in which this article uses the term source is as an ‘entry point’ or 
an ‘argument’. Whether a standard is binding or not on an investor, it is still 
necessary to identify how it may become operative in an investment arbitration 
proceeding. As this article will show, norms or standards can be used to argue that 																																																								
4  See generally Viñuales, above n. 1, chapter 4.  
5  See Jorge E. Viñuales, ‘The Sources of International Investment Law’, in S. Besson, J. d’Aspremont (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 24. 
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an investment is not protected as a result of its illegality (mostly viewed as a 
matter of jurisdiction) or that, even if the tribunal had jurisdiction, it should not 
exercise it (e.g. in cases of corruption or breaches of international public policy), 
or that much more diligence would have been expected from a sophisticated 
investor in a regulated industry (and, as a result, it cannot claim to have a 
reasonable or legitimate expectation) or, still, that the lack of diligence warrants a 
reduction of the compensation due (e.g. because such lack of diligence was a 
contributing factor to or concurring cause of the damage suffered). 
When commentators, negotiators and practitioners refer to the term sources, 
these different meanings are not always disentangled. The distinction is, however, 
useful for two main purposes. Firstly, it provides three different analytical angles 
of the same reality, which is each time considered from a different vantage point 
in order to reach different conclusions (What are the main standards? What is 
their legal grounding? How can they operate in investment arbitration?). 
Secondly, the distinction helps identify the areas that have received sufficient 
attention and analysis (the first meaning of the ‘sources’ of investor diligence) and 
those that have not (the second and third meanings). 
2.2. Sources as ‘loci’ 
The initial approach in the development of a body of investor diligence norms was 
to adopt standards of conduct directly applicable to the operations of multinational 
companies. Over time, another body of standards has also emerged affecting such 
operations only indirectly, by targeting financial intermediaries.6  
2.2.1. The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises – The most 
prominent illustrations of direct standards are the efforts undertaken within the 
framework of the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Historically, the two processes were linked 
because the OECD initiative was undertaken by developed countries at a time 
where a UN draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations was the object 
of vivid debates between developed and developing countries.7 Whereas the main 
results of the OECD process were the ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’8, 
the UN process has led over time to the elaboration of a series of documents and 
frameworks,9 including the ‘UN Global Compact’.10 Here, the discussion will 																																																								
6  B. J. Richardson, ‘Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of Socially Responsible 
Investment’ (2006) 17 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 73, at 74. 
7  Ibid., 102. 
8  OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Annex I to the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises, 25 May 2011 (‘OECD Guidelines’). 
9  See E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 
2009), pp. 77-101. 
10  UN Global Compact, at www.globalcompact.org (accessed on 31 May 2016). On the operation of the Global 
Compact see UN Global Compact Office, United Nations Guide to the Global Compact: A Practical 
Understanding of the Vision and the Nine Principles; B. King, ‘The UN Global Compact: Responsibility for 
Human Rights, Labour Relations, and the Environment in Developing Nations’ (2001) 34 Cornell International 
Law Journal 481. 
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focus on the OECD Guidelines, which are arguably the main CSR instrument of 
its kind.  
The Guidelines were adopted in 1976 and subsequently updated five times, 
most recently in May 2011. The approach followed in the Guidelines is that of  
‘recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises’. 11  They cover a variety of areas including human rights, 
environmental protection, social rights, corruption and consumer interests, and 
they apply to multinational companies (broadly defined to include both parent 
companies and/or local entities12) operating ‘in or from’ the territories of adhering 
countries.13 Their observance by covered enterprises is ‘voluntary and not legally 
enforceable’, 14  but their enforcement, organised by Part II of the OECD 
Guidelines, is based on a rather sophisticated system of accountability. States 
adhering to the guidelines are required to establish ‘national contact points’ 
(NCPs),15 the function of which is inter alia to receive complaints from civil 
society groups relating to the implementation of the guidelines by multinational 
corporations (‘Specific instances’).16 Upon receipt of a complaint, NCPs ‘[m]ake 
an initial assessment of whether the issues raised merit further examination’17 and, 
if so, they ‘offer good offices to help the parties involved to resolve the issues’.18 
If no agreement is reached, NCPs ‘issue a statement, and make recommendations 
as appropriate, on the implementation of the Guidelines’.19 In some cases, the 
NCP procedures have been combined with other – potentially more powerful – 
mechanisms, such as judicial means of dispute settlement.20 
2.2.2. The IFC Performance Standards – Indirect standards encompass a 
number of principles and policy instruments aimed at regulating the activities of 
financial intermediaries, including the World Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and private financial institutions (commercial banks, 
																																																								
11  OECD Guidelines, above n. 8, chapter I, para 1. 
12  Ibid., chapter I, para 4. 
13  OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 25 May 2011 (‘OECD 
Declaration’), para I, available at www.oecd.org (accessed on 31 May 2016). 
14  OECD Guidelines, above n. 8, chapter I, para 1. 
15  OECD, Part II: Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ‘Decision of 
the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises’ (‘Council Decision’), para I.1. 
16  OECD, Part II: Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ‘Procedural 
Guidance’ document (‘Procedural Guidance’), para I.C. 
17  Ibid., para I.C.1. 
18  Ibid., para I.C.2. 
19  Ibid., para I.C.3. 
20  See e.g. Press release by the Finnish NCP on Metsä-Botnia in Uruguay (22 December 2006) (‘Botnia case’), 
which is related to the dispute before the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14. See also the 2009 Vedanta case before the UK 
National Contact Point  (Final statement by the UK NCP on the complaint from Survival International 
against Vedanta Resources plc, 25 September 2009) and the subsequent decisions of the India Supreme Court 
regarding the conflict between, on the one hand, Vedanta and the local government and, on the other hand, the 
Dongria Kondh people who oppose bauxite mining in their sacred land: Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. 
Ministry of Environment & Forest & Others, in the Supreme Court of India Civil Original Jurisdiction, Writ 
Petition (Civil) no. 180 of 2011, Judgment of 19 April 2013 (‘Vedanta case’). 
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investment banks, insurance companies and pension funds). 21  Among the 
numerous instruments falling under this category, one may mention the IFC’s 
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability,22 the Equator 
Principles, 23  the UNEPFI-led Statement by Financial Institutions on the 
Environment and Sustainable Development,24 the UN Principles of Responsible 
Investment,25 and many others. Despite some variation from one instrument to 
another, they all operate by setting social and environmental standards for project 
financing by public, institutional or private financiers. Thus, access to funding by 
promoters of infrastructure or other projects with potentially harmful implications 
is subject to the respect of a number of sustainability standards.  
A major example of an indirect (SRI) instrument is given by the IFC’s 
Performance Standards. The standards were developed through a process that 
lasted some fifteen years as a means to ensure that both the IFC and its clients 
(‘IFC-funded projects’) conduct their activities in a manner that is socially and 
environmentally responsible. Initially limited to a vague reference to ‘appropriate 
World Bank environmental policies and guidelines’,26 the policy was expanded in 
1998, 2003 and 2006, before taking its present form in January 2012. The 
operation of the Performance Standards is based on a combination of (i) eight 
standards focusing on social and environmental protection and (ii) a rather 
sophisticated enforcement mechanism through the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (‘CAO’). Regarding the latter, those affected by an IFC-financed 
project can bring a complaint before the CAO for breach of the IFC Performance 
Standards. In case of breach, sanctions may go as far as the suspension of the 
funding of the project. The CAO has handled several dozens of cases so far, either 
in its capacity of ombudsman (disputes between the IFC’s ‘client’ and 
complaining stakeholders) and/or in its compliance role (audits of the IFC itself). 
These direct and indirect sources of investor diligence standards are well 
known examples of CSR and SRI instruments. In most cases, they are of a soft-
law nature, although they can be ‘hardened’ through a variety of mechanisms that 
provide them with a legal anchor. 
2.3. Sources as ‘anchors’ 
																																																								
21  See Richardson, Financing Sustainability, above n. 6; Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law, above 
n. 3. 
22  International Finance Corporation (IFC), Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, 
available at www.ifc.org/sustainability (accessed on 31 May 2016).  
23  Equator Principles, available at www.equator-principles.com (accessed on 31 May 2016). 
24  UNEP Finance Initiative, Statement by Financial Institutions on the Environment and Sustainable 
Development, available at www.unepfi.org (accessed on 31 May 2016). 
25  United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment, available at www.unpri.org/principles (accessed on 31 
May 2016). 
26 IFC, Environmental Analysis and Review of International Finance Corporation Projects. Procedure for 
Environmental Review of the International Finance Corporation (8 September 1993), reproduced in Morgera, 
above n. 9, at 147. 
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An anchor provision can be understood as a provision (in domestic or 
international law) that incorporates or in some other way gives legal effect 
between certain parties to standards or norms that would not otherwise be binding 
upon such parties. More broadly, it may refer to the legal grounding (the source) 
that makes certain standards or norms binding. As far as investor diligence is 
concerned, and particularly the degree of diligence that can be taken into account 
in the context of an investment dispute, four main types of anchors can be 
identified. 
2.3.1. Enhanced voluntary standards – The first example refers to anchors 
that may give voluntary standards (addressing the question of investor diligence) 
an enhanced normative value. To continue with the example of the OECD 
Guidelines, although the standards are voluntary, their implementation may be 
strengthened through at least three avenues. First, the standards set out in the 
Guidelines ‘may also be regulated by national law or international 
commitments’,27 in which case their observance may be required by law. Second, 
adhering States ‘make a binding commitment to implement them in accordance 
with the Decision of the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’.28 This decision requires adhering States to implement 
into their domestic legislation the system of accountability described in Part II of 
the Guidelines (national contact points) discussed earlier.29  Third, when the 
domestic laws and regulations of the host States where covered enterprises 
operate are inconsistent with the Guidelines, enterprises ‘should seek ways to 
honour such principles and standards to the fullest extent which does not place 
them in violation of domestic law’.30 
Of course, except for the first hypothesis (where standards are incorporated as 
law), this remains an example of strengthened CSR. But, aside from the 
potentially far-reaching effects of such an enhanced form of CSR, 31  the 
strengthening may itself operate as an anchor when articulated with other relevant 
processes. By way of illustration of the latter point, some complaints were 
brought before NCPs in connection with the exploitation of natural resources in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo,32 which in turn triggered the establishment, in 
2000, of a ‘Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ by the United 
																																																								
27  Ibid., chapter I, para 1. 
28  Ibid., preface, para 1. 
29  See section 4.3. below. 
30  OECD Guidelines, above n. 8, chapter I, para 2. 
31  See Michelin Group in India - Statement of the French National Contact Point  for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, 27 September 2013, available at: http://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/File/397224 
(accessed on 31 May 2016). In this case, the Michelin group agreed to develop a specific policy not only for the 
case for which the specific instance had been brought but also applicable to other foreign operations of 
Michelin. 
32  O. K. Fauchald, ‘International Investment Law and Environmental Protection’ (2006) 17 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 3, at 43ff. 
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Nations Security Council.33 The Panel issued its first final report in 2002, finding 
that 85 named enterprises were in violation of the guidelines.34 Eventually, 
however, the follow-up of these cases was mostly35 left to the NCPs of the 
relevant home countries, and very few cases were actually continued, apparently 
for lack of sufficiently detailed information.36 
2.3.2. Compliance – To cross the line and enter into law proper, one has to 
move from ‘CSR’ to what is usually referred to as ‘compliance’, namely specific 
reporting obligations imposed by domestic law (often following international 
initiatives) in areas such as the fight against money laundering,37 corruption38 or 
natural resource extraction in conflict areas. 39  In the context of investment 
proceedings, there are many examples of cases where corruption and/or money 
laundering on the investor’s part have been alleged40 and, when proven, the 
allegation has been dispositive of the case.  
A well-known illustration is the case World Duty Free v. Kenya,41 where the 
investor sought to enforce a contract obtained by means of a payment made to the 
then Kenyan president. The agreement referred, in its arbitration and choice-of-
law clauses, to English and Kenyan law. The tribunal dismissed the claim under 
both international law (relying on the concept of ordre public international) and 
domestic English and Kenyan law. It noted that bribery was a criminal offense 
under the applicable Kenyan laws and that contracts obtained by bribery were 																																																								
33  UN Doc S/PRST/2000/20. 
34  Final Report (1) of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146 (2002), para 170-8 and Annex III, referred to by 
Fauchald, above n. 32, 43. 
35  The UN Security Council followed up on those cases where the illegal resource exploitation was closely linked 
to illegal import of arms into the Congo. See UN Doc S/RES/1533 (2004) establishing a Committee to examine 
such cases. This committee took a number of measures, but none of the multinational enterprises subject to the 
OECD Guidelines seems to have been targeted. See Ibid., 44, at footnote 180. 
36  Fauchald, above n. 32, 44-45. 
37  See the knowledge platform devoted to this question by the International Bar Association: http://www.anti-
moneylaundering.org/ (accessed on 31 May 2016). 
38  See e.g. the UK 2010 Bribery Act, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents 
(accessed on 31 May 2016), or the US 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/11/14/fcpa-english.pdf (accessed on 31 
May 2016).  
39  See e.g. title XV of the US 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, under which 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission issued regulations requiring specific disclosure by certain 
companies of their use of conflict minerals, available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-
frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml (accessed on 31 May 2016). 
40  See e.g. Wena Hotels LTD. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award (8 December 2000), 
para 111; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Award on Jurisdiction (6 August 2003), para 141-143; TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award (19 December 2008), para 175-176; African Holding 
Company of America, Inc. and Société Africaine de Construction au Congo S.A.R.L. v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/21, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (29 July 2008), para 52; 
Sistem Muhendislik Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. Kyrgyz Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/1, Award 
(9 September 2009), para 42-45 ; Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Award 
on Respondent Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the Claims (21 June 2012) (‘Al-
Warraq v. Indonesia’), para 99 ; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the 
Philippines [II], ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12, Award (10 December 2014), para 479 ; Valeri Belokon v. Kyrgyz 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (24 October 2014), para 158.  
41  World Duty Free Company Limited v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (4 October 2006). 
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deemed unenforceable in the common law authorities relevant to the case. 
Interestingly, the investor sought to mitigate the consequences of its illegal act 
highlighting the illegal conduct of the Kenyan president, and it asked the tribunal 
to achieve a balance between both. However, the tribunal firmly dismissed this 
argument noting that, even if there had been a rule allowing such exercise of 
equitable judgment, its use would have been of no help to the claimant. Indeed, 
the apparent unfairness of letting Kenya benefit from the illegal act of its 
president missed the point that the public policy concepts applicable in this case 
were intended to protect the public as well as to deprive any claimant (including 
Kenya, had it been the claimant in the case) from relying on a court of law to 
enforce an act executed against basic public policy principles.42  
A similar stance has been taken by the tribunal in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, 
which noted that the condemnation of corruption in Uzbek law was consistent 
with international law and the laws of most countries and, after finding that there 
had been indeed corruption, declined jurisdiction to hear the claim.43 At that point, 
the tribunal also acknowledged the unbalanced effects of a finding of corruption 
but it added, in the same line as the tribunal in World Duty Free v. Kenya, that 
‘the idea [ … ] is not to punish one party at the cost of the other, but rather to 
ensure the promotion of the rule of law, which entails that a court or tribunal 
cannot grant assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act.’44 While 
corruption and money laundering acts are clearly a matter of compliance, some 
other norms may also become a matter of compliance in time. Indeed, the 
boundary between CSR and compliance is not set in stone and it may be moving 
to include areas such as human rights. A significant development in this regard is 
the adoption by the International Bar Association of Guidance on Business and 
Human Rights 45  that should be followed, as a matter of deontology and 
professional practice, by lawyers advising companies around the world.  
2.3.3. International obligations of investors – Another approach is the 
creation of a system of investor due diligence obligations directly at the 
international level. This approach is theoretically much simpler but practically and 
politically much more controversial. Unsurprisingly, there are very few examples 
of instruments that have introduced such obligations.  
One oft-quoted example may be provided by the potential outcome of the 
process initiated in 2014 by the Human Rights Council,46 on the initiative of 
Ecuador, and entrusted to an Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 																																																								
42  Ibid., para 176-178. 
43  Another example is Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 October 
2013, para 290-291, 389. 
44  Ibid., para 389. 
45  IBA Business and Human Rights Guidance for Bar Associations, with commentaries, 8 October 2015, available 
at: www.ibanet.org (visited on 15 May 2016). 
46  ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights’, Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/9, 14 July 2014. 
Jorge E. Viñuales, ‘Investor diligence in investment arbitration: Sources and arguments’ (2017) 32(3) ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, forthcoming 2017. 
 	
rights (Open-ended Group). It is unclear whether, if the negotiations were to reach 
a successful outcome, such outcome would take the form, at least partly, of direct 
international obligations imposed on transnational corporations. At the first 
session of the Open-ended Group, the Ecuadorian chair of the group proposed a 
concept note47 where this approach is suggested as one possibility, albeit not the 
main one. Indeed, paragraph 2 of the concept note recalls that: ‘Resolution 26/9 stresses that the obligation and primary responsibility to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms lies with the State, and that States must protect against 
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including 
transnational corporations. While the obligation of States to regulate business activities within 
their territorial jurisdiction is clear, on the other hand States’ obligations regarding corporate 
conduct acting abroad remain unclear’ (italics added)  
But then, in paragraph 4, the note stresses that:  ‘the international legal system reflects an asymmetry between rights and obligations of TNCs. 
While TNCs are granted rights through hard law instruments, such as bilateral investment treaties 
and investment rules in free trade agreements, and have access to a system of investor-state 
dispute settlement, there are no hard law instruments that address the obligations of corporations to 
respect human rights.’ 
In fairness, however, this cannot be considered as a clear example of an 
instrument or a process aiming at imposing direct international obligations on 
investors, at least not at present. 
A clearer illustration48 is provided by the 2016 Draft Pan-African Investment 
Code, prepared under the aegis of the African Union,49 which devotes a full 
chapter (chapter 4) to ‘Investor Obligations’. Of particular note is the use of the 
terms ‘Investors shall’ before the formulation of a series of standards regarding 
corporate governance (Article 19), socio-political obligations (Article 20), bribery 
(Article 21), corporate social responsibility (Article 22) and the use of natural 
resources (Article 23). The provision devoted to ‘Business Ethics and Human 
Rights’ (Article 24) is instead preceded by the word ‘should’ and sets a number of 
principles that should govern the conduct of investors. If the code becomes 
binding, these provisions would have direct effect, operating as a set of uniform 
domestic law (droit uniforme) adopted by treaty and adding a regulatory layer to 
the relevant legal frameworks of States parties.  
2.3.4. Treaty references to CSR – Given the practical difficulties involved in 
developing a treaty providing for specific and clear obligations directly imposed 																																																								
47  Concept note proposed under the responsibility of the designated Chair, Amb. María Fernanda Espinosa, 
Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations in Geneva, July 6th-10th 2015. 
48  I am indebted to Professor Makane Mbengue, from the University of Geneva, for having drawn my attention to 
this example. 
49  Draft Pan-African Investment Code, ECOSOC/African Union E/ECA/COE/35/18, 
AU/STC/FMEPI/EXP/18(II), 26 March 2016 (‘Draft Pan-African Code’). Another example that has been 
referred to as providing for direct international obligations on investor is the Investment Agreement for the 
COMESA Common Investment Area, 23 May 2007. However, on closer inspection, this Agreement only 
contains one clear provision (Article 13, entitled ‘Investor Obligation’), which, in fact, is a fairly recurrent 
clause also found in many other investment agreements according to which investors must comply with 
domestic law (the term used in Article 13 is ‘domestic measures’). 
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on investors, a midway ‘anchor’ provision referring generally to corporate social 
responsibility may be a useful compromise. An UNCTAD Report50 analysing 18 
international investment agreements or IIAs (11 BITs and 7 FTAs) that were 
concluded in 2013 shows that some of these treaties (5 out of 18) contain a 
reference to CSR standards in the form of either a separate clause or preambular 
language.51  
A good example of this trend is provided by the 2009 Canada-Peru FTA, 
which contains both types of references.52 Indeed, in the preamble both parties 
agree to ‘encourage entreprises operating within their territory or subject to their 
jurisdiction, to respect internationally recognized corporate social responsibility 
standards and principles and pursue best practices’. Subsequently, in the 
investment chapter of the agreement, Article 810 entitled ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ provides that: 
‘Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction 
to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in 
their internal policies, such as statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by 
the Parties. These principles address issues such as labor, the environment, human rights, 
community relations and anti-corruption. The Parties therefore remind those enterprises of the 
importance of incorporating such corporate social responsibility standards in their internal 
policies’ 
From the perspective of ‘anchor’ provisions, the language used is clearly a best 
efforts one (‘encourage’, ‘should’, ‘voluntarily incorporate’).  
Similar language is used in some so-called mega-regional trade and 
investment agreements, such as the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). 53 Article 9.17 of the investment chapter, entitled ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, provides that: 
‘The Parties reaffirm the importance of each Party encouraging enterprises operating within its 
territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies those 
internationally recognised standards, guidelines and principles of corporate social responsibility 
that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party.’ 
The normative value of such clauses and, particularly, their ability to operate as 
anchors is unclear both because of the hortatory language used and, more 
importantly, because the exhortation is addressed to State parties rather than to 
companies. However, an investor seeking the protection of such treaties is thereby 
made aware that all States parties expect the host State (and potentially the home 
State) to ensure that the operations of investors abide by certain internationally 																																																								
50  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014. Investing in the SDGs (2014) (‘UNCTAD 2014’), available at: 
www.unctad.org (visited on 15 May 2016).  
51  Ibid., p. 117.  
52  See Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, signed on 29 May 2008, available at: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/peru-toc-perou-
tdm.aspx?lang=eng (accessed on 31 May 2016). A 2011 UNEP Report on CSR in FTAs presents the Canada-
Peru FTA as groundbreaking in its treatment of CSR. See UNEP, Corporate Social Responsibility and Regional 
Trade and Investment Agreements (2011), p.  25. 
53  Trans-Pacific Partnership (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, United States, Vietnam), 4 February 2016 (‘TPP’). 
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recognised CSR standards. As a result, investors could reasonably expect that they 
will be able to operate under lower standards, which in turn limits the range of 
what they can reasonably claim (and obtain) in investment proceedings. 
2.4. Sources as ‘entry points’ 
So far, I have discussed some sources where standards of investor diligence can 
be found as well as some legal mechanisms through which they can be legally 
grounded. This section focuses on how such norms and standards may operate in 
investment arbitration. To avoid speculations, I analyse only those ‘entry points’ 
or uses for which specific and realistic examples can be identified. This is in my 
view important, to disentangle law from mere hope. There are examples in the 
investment jurisprudence to support the proposition that the degree of investor 
diligence can play a role at different stages of investment proceedings: 
jurisdiction, admissibility, merits, and quantum. The discussion follows this order. 
2.4.1. Investor diligence and jurisdictional matters – Regarding the 
jurisdictional phase, the degree of investor diligence may be relevant to assess 
whether an investment is ‘covered’ or ‘protected’ by an IIA. From a technical 
perspective, investor negligence is captured at this stage to the extent that it 
constitutes a material breach of domestic law. Some IIAs include provisions 
according to which they provide protection only to investments ‘made in 
accordance with the law of the host State’54 and there is authority to consider that 
even in the absence of such a clause, the legality requirement must be read as an 
implicit term of the treaty.55 The interpretation and application of such clauses has 
encountered some challenges, particularly in connection with the determination of 
when an investment is ‘made’ (a distinction between ‘initial’ and ‘subsequent’ 
illegality is often drawn56) and what are the laws relevant for the assessment of 
the initial (il)legality of the investment.  																																																								
54  See e.g. Egypt—Pakistan BIT (2000), art 1(1); Bahrain—Thailand BIT (2002), art 2, reproduced in A. Joubin-
Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ in A. Reinisch (ed.) Standards of 
Investment Protection (2008) 17. Such a reference to the host State’s laws concerns the validity of an 
investment and not the definition of the term investment itself, see e.g. Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (23 July 2003), para 46. However, in a growing number of cases, the legality of an investment 
has been considered as a jurisdictional obstacle. 
55  See Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 2008), 138-139; 
Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009), para 101; Hulley 
Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226, Final Award 
(18 July 2014), para 1349-1352;Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award (18 July 2014), para 1349-1352; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. 
The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award (18 July 2014), para 1349-1352. 
56  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 
Award (16 August 2007), para 345; Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/15, Award (28 July 2015), para 420; Hulley v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1354-1356; Yukos v. Russia, 
above n. 55, para 1354-1356; Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1354-1356; Copper Mesa Mining 
Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA No. 2012-2, Award (15 March 2016), para 5.54 ff; 
Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award (22 August 
2016), para 289ff. Two specificities must be noted in this regard. Firstly, the illegality of a transaction or 
scheme that occurs even prior to the moment when the investment is made can be relevant. See e.g. Alasdair 
Ross Anderson and others v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/3, Award (19 May 2010), para 51-61 
(where the illegality of the ‘ponzi’ scheme in which the investors invested barred jurisdiction). Hulley v. Russia, 
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Importantly, this inquiry must be distinguished from that concerning the law 
applicable to settle an investment dispute over which a tribunal has already 
asserted jurisdiction. The laws governing the initial (il)legality will typically be a 
subset of the law applicable to settle the dispute. Over time, investment tribunals 
have tended to expand the scope of the laws governing initial (il)legality. A line 
can be drawn from some early cases such as Inceysa v. El Salvador, where the 
initial illegality is defined by some fundamental norms such as the prohibition of 
corruption,57 to cases such as Saba Fakes v. Turkey, which define narrowly the 
domestic laws relevant for the determination of initial illegality,58 to the more 
recent decision in Mamidoil v. Albania, where the laws relevant to define the 
initial illegality are more broadly understood.59  
The latter case is significant for the impact of investor diligence on 
jurisdictional matters. The dispute concerned allegations of mistreatment of a 
Greek investor in connection with the construction and operation of an oil 
container terminal as well as petrol stations in Albania. The respondent argued, 
among others, that the investment had not been made in accordance with the host 
States’ domestic laws. Specifically, it referred to the fact that the claimant had 
failed to conduct any due diligence assessment and had not sought the relevant 
(construction, environmental and exploitation) permits. Although the tribunal 
found that the lack of construction and exploitation permits amounted to a non-
trivial illegality, it – debatably – asserted jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
respondent had been cooperative enough and stood ready to cure the illegality 
arising from the procedural irregularities. It thus moved the issue of illegality to 
the assessment of the merits of the dispute, where it eventually rejected the claim. 
For present purposes, however, what is worth noting is how the tribunal reached 
that conclusion.  
Such reasoning can be summarised in four points. Firstly, the tribunal 
adhered to the increasingly well-established distinction between initial and 
subsequent illegality.60 Secondly, and importantly, it noted that illegality can arise 
out of inconsistency with substantive and/or procedural domestic law, and it 																																																																																																																																																							
above n. 55, para 1369-1370; Yukos v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1369-1370; Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, 
above n. 55, para 1369-1370 (‘The Tribunal agrees with Respondent that an examination of the legality of an 
investment should not be limited to verifying whether the last in a series of transactions leading up to the 
investment was in conformity with the law. The making of the investment will often consist of several 
consecutive acts and all of these must be legal and bona fide [ … ] the alleged illegalities to which it refers are 
sufficiently connected with the final transaction by which the investment was made by Claimants.’) 
57  Inceysa Vallisoletane, SL v. El Salvador, ICSID No ARB/03/26, Award (2 August 2006), para 257, 264. For a 
recent iteration of this approach see ECE Projektmanagement International GmbH and Kommanditgesellschaft 
PANTA Achtundsechzigste Grundstücksgesellschaft mbH & Co v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2010-5, 
Award (19 September 2013), para 3.170 – 3.171. 
58  Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award (12 July 2010), para 119 (according to the tribunal, 
only the illegality arising from a violation of the host State’s law relating to the admission of investments would 
exclude jurisdiction). For an iteration of this approach see Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (4 October 2013), para 165. 
59  Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe Anonyme S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/24, Award (30 March 2015), para 372, 378. 
60  Ibid., para 359. 
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understood both bodies of law broadly.61 Investors are therefore expected to 
identify all necessary requirements and diligently comply with them. Thirdly, not 
any violation of domestic law can defeat jurisdiction. The rationale is indeed that 
States should not be expected to have forgone their immunity of jurisdiction – 
consenting to arbitration – for investments made illegally, but at the same time, 
allegations of illegality must be circumscribed to avoid abuse.62 The level of 
investor negligence that is relevant for jurisdictional purposes is therefore one that 
amounts to material breaches of domestic law, not minor irregularities. Fourthly, 
the tribunal admitted the possibility that initial illegality may not defeat 
jurisdiction when the respondent has forgone the possibility of invoking it (e.g. 
because the deficiency was cured domestically or on the basis of estoppel) or 
when the State has stood ready to remedy the illegality.63 The latter stance is 
debatable. It amounts to endorsing the view that a host State who behaves in a 
constructive manner – e.g. by not moving to demolish an installation built in 
breach of a construction permit – cannot avail itself of the argument that an 
investment has been made illegally and hence does not benefit from the protection 
of the treaty. In other words, at least for jurisdictional purposes, the State’s good 
will and diligence are used to cure investors’ negligence. That solution may have 
been warranted for factual reasons arising in this specific case, but it is misguided 
as a general principle.  
2.4.2. Investor diligence and admissibility matters – The difference between 
jurisdiction and admissibility is well known, although not always clearly applied. 
A claim over which a tribunal ‘can’ exercise jurisdiction, may be such that the 
tribunal ‘should not’ exercise jurisdiction. Stated differently, the tribunal does not 
lack the power to hear a claim, but it should not use it.64 The assessment of 																																																								
61  On the scope of the relevant substantive law, the tribunal stated the following: ‘[t]he Tribunal finds that an 
investment can be illegal and as a consequence not protected by investment conventions when it contravenes 
substantive law, in other words when it does not comply with material norms regulating investments. Norms 
may prohibit certain business activities, such as the production of drugs, or they may reserve certain sectors to 
national entities or protect certain sectorial or geographical areas, for example, by making an investment in a 
national park illegal’ (ibid., para 372). On the scope of the relevant procedural law, the tribunal noted that ‘[t]he 
second source of possible illegality concerns procedural rules. In the Tribunal’s view, an investment can be 
found illegal for procedural reasons when the investor does not respect the norms regulating the process of 
investment. The investment may be legal in substance but still tainted by illegality when the investor violates 
procedural norms and regulations for setting up its investment’ (ibid., para 378). It then went on to analyse 
consistency with construction, environmental and operation requirements. Although the scope of the relevant 
laws was challenged by the claimant-appointed arbitrator in a dissenting opinion (see Dissenting Opinion of 
Steven A. Hammond, 30 March 2015, para 128-131), the majority’s stance is more accurate as a general 
principle. See the discussion in Viñuales, above n. 1, pp. 98-99. 
62  As noted by the tribunal: ‘[t]he Tribunal agrees with the view that not every trivial, minor contravention of the 
law should lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. It must strike a balance between two criteria. On the one hand, 
neither Claimant nor the Tribunal may presume that the host State waives its sovereignty and agrees to the 
arbitration of disputes when the investor made the investment in violation of its substantive or procedural 
legislation. On the other hand, States must not be allowed to abuse the process by scrutinizing the investment 
post festum with the intention of rooting out minor or trivial illegalities as a pretext to free themselves of an 
obligation. A State must act consistently with its obligations and not resist jurisdiction because it wants to 
escape the consequences of its standing agreement to arbitrate’, ibid., para 483. 
63  Ibid., para 490-495. 
64  Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic [II], PCA Case No. 2013-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (20 May 
2014), para 114-119. See also Abaclat and Others (Case formerly known as Giovanna a Beccara and Others) v. 
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whether it should or should not use such power is different from the assessment as 
to whether it has or not this power, as well as from the assessment of the actual 
claims (which assumes both the power and its use). There are a number of 
practical differences between characterising an issue as a matter of jurisdiction or 
one of admissibility, including the moment in the arbitration proceeding at which 
such an argument can be made,65 the burden of proof,66 and the scope for review 
of the decision.67 But for present purposes, the main consideration is whether the 
degree of investor diligence can play a role in the assessment of admissibility. 
From a technical standpoint, three main legal concepts have been mobilised to 
assert the inadmissibility of a claim on the basis of investor’s fault, namely the 
illegality of the investment (see previous section), the doctrine of unclean hands, 
and the concept of transnational public policy (or ‘ordre public international’). 
Concerning the unclean hands doctrine, the matter has featured prominently 
in three investment claims brought against the Russian Federation over the 
expropriation of Yukos.68 In the Yukos cases, after joining the objection to the 
discussion on the merits, the tribunal rejected it as such but took into account the 
tax avoidance actions of Yukos in its analysis of contributory fault. The sections 
of the awards relating to unclean hands as a preliminary objection are of particular 
relevance because the tribunal discusses the existence of ‘unclean hands’ as a 
general principle of law in the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.69 
The analysis is rigorous and considers many decisions from the ICJ and its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), before rejecting 
the existence of such a rule.70 It may be noted however that, in reaching its 
conclusion, the tribunal seemed to overemphasise the lack of recognition of the 
unclean hands doctrine by a majority in a court or tribunal (by contrast with 
dissenting opinions) instead of focusing on the practice in foro domestico and the 
potential transposal of such a principle to the international plane, as the very 
concept of a general principle of law would require.71 Thus, I do not believe that 
the conclusions of the tribunal on this point settle the principle. Another 
illustration is provided by the Copper Mesa v. Ecuador case, where the tribunal 																																																																																																																																																							
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion, Georges Abi-Saab (28 October 2011), 
para 18. 
65  HOCHTIEF Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Liability (29 
December 2014), para 149. 
66  Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/13, Award (2 March 2015), para 212. 
67  See Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press, 2009), para 307.  
68  In the three cases, the tribunal considered the ‘unclean hands’ argument as part of the merits of the claim. See 
Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226, Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 November 2009), para 435 ; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of 
Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (30 November 2009), para 436 ; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 November 2009), 
para 492.  
69  Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 993. 
70   See Hulley v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1358-1373; Yukos v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1358-1373; Veteran 
Petroleum v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1358-1373. 
71  See J. Barberis, Fuentes del derecho internacional (La Plata: Editora Platense, 1973), pp. 3-30. 
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characterised the objection as one of inadmissibility (rather than lack of 
jurisdiction) and then, after considering that it was too late in the proceedings to 
raise such an objection, assimilated a number of different concepts (unclean 
hands, causation, contributory fault) as materially equivalent and left the matter 
for the discussion of liability/quantum. 72  The tribunal’s approach will be 
discussed in connection with the entry points of investor’s negligence at the 
merits level. It is noteworthy however that, despite a factual finding that the 
investor had ‘resort[ed] to recruiting and using armed men, firing guns and 
spraying mace at civilians, not as an accidental or isolated incident but as part of 
premeditated, disguised and well-funded plans to take the law into its own 
hands’73 nevertheless deemed the claim relating to that portion of the investment 
admissible. Investment decisions are always fact-sensitive and it is difficult to 
understand a given approach without the benefit of a full briefing of the facts. 
However, it is difficult not to be perplexed by this finding in the light of the very 
rationale of the concept of admissibility. A State is not only entitled but it has a 
duty to act, under international human rights law, to cease such deliberate misuse 
of private security forces by a foreign investor. Resort by an investor to such 
abusive and illegal practices is totally unacceptable and a claim based on the 
consequences of such action is clearly inadmissible.  
As for the concept of transnational public policy, the most prominent 
illustration in this regard concerns investors’ violations of what I have referred to 
earlier as norms or standards of compliance (e.g. anti-corruption and money 
laundering laws and principles). The case of World Duty Free v. Kenya discussed 
in the previous section is not necessarily a clear illustration, as the corruption 
allegation targeted the very existence of a contract, which in turn was a condition 
for the jurisdiction of the tribunal. But there may be cases in which the basis of 
jurisdiction is provided by a valid treaty and, yet, acts of corruption by the 
investor are deemed to make treaty protection unavailable. As with other issues, 
the treatment of this question in investment decisions has varied with tribunals 
considering such issues as a matter of jurisdiction (for lack of ‘investment’ or 
‘consent’) or merits.74 But there is no legal impediment to characterise such 
arguments as objections to the admissibility of a claim.75 An investor may have 
acquired two public companies at different points in time, one of them 
legitimately and the other on the basis of a bribe. If these companies are targeted 
by an act of the host State, a treaty-based investment tribunal would have 
jurisdiction over the claims, but one of the claims (regarding the company 
acquired through the bribe) would be inadmissible. It is possible – but not 
necessary – that the corrupt act taints the entire action of the investor and leads the 																																																								
72  See Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above n. 56, para 5.62-5.66 
73  Ibid., para 6.99. 
74  See above n. 40. 
75  Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award (15 December 2014), para 
646-648 (remarkably stating that although the claimant did not receive fair and equitable treatment, it is 
prevented from pursuing this claim because the ‘clean hands’ doctrine makes it inadmissible). 
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tribunal to dismiss the claims without reviewing the merits, but analytically the 
question of corruption in this case could be articulated as one of admissibility, 
with the ensuing practical consequences mentioned earlier. 
2.4.3. Investor diligence as a matter to be reviewed on the merits – The usual 
stage at which the degree of investor diligence will be considered is in connection 
with the merits of the investor’s claims or those of State counter-claims. There are 
several entry points for consideration of investor diligence or negligence at this 
stage but, for present purposes, I will organise the discussion from two main 
perspectives. The first perspective concerns references to the degree of investor 
diligence as part of a State’s defence against allegations for breach of an 
investment treaty. The degree of investor diligence operates here as a factual or 
interpretive element in the light of which the appropriateness of State action is to 
be assessed or, relatedly, the scope of protection of investment protection 
standards is to be determined. The second perspective relates to the use of 
investor negligence as part of a State counter-claim. 
The first perspective can be sub-divided into two main categories, namely (i) 
investor negligence justifying intervention from State authorities; (ii) investor’s 
degree of diligence in forming a reasonable expectation. In the two cases, 
investor’s negligence has provided grounds to conclude that measures from State 
authorities (whether general regulations or targeted measures) were consistent 
with investment protection standards or, in other words, that the protection 
claimed by the investor required some degree of diligence on its part to be fully 
enjoyed. The first category can be illustrated by reference to cases such as Azinian 
v. Mexico76 or Genin v. Estonia77. In these two cases, the reckless or negligent 
conduct of the investor provided, to the eyes of the tribunal, justification for the 
adverse targeted action undertaken by the State. In some other cases, such as 
Occidental v. Ecuador78 or the Yukos cases, tribunals have established a link 
between investors’ negligence and the measures challenged. In both examples, the 
negligent conduct of the investor (e.g. not requiring the necessary authorisation 
before proceeding to a transfer of rights or embarking into an aggressive tax 
avoidance strategy) was deemed to be causally related to the wrongful act of the 
host State, although the latter deliberately took disproportionate measures 
(terminating an agreement or forcing a company into bankruptcy) that went 
beyond what was warranted by the investors’ conduct. Negligence can be (and has 
been) argued in this context on the basis of arguments such as causality or 
contributory fault. Tribunals have relied on the rules stated in Articles 31 and 39 																																																								
76  Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian & Ellen Baca v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 
Award (1 November 1999), para 103-105. 
77  Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Ltd Inc. and AS Baltoil v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (25 June 
2001), para 361. 
78  Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012). This award has been subsequently annulled for 
manifest excess of powers in assuming jurisdiction, although not in connection with the specific point discussed 
here. See Decision on Annulment of the Award (2 November 2015). 
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of the ILC Articles,79 but they have framed this issue as a matter of liability or 
quantum.80 Given that these rules relate to the consequences of internationally 
wrongful acts, I will discuss them in connection with quantum.  
The second category encompasses a larger number of examples. Importantly, 
investor diligence is a key consideration in assessing the reasonableness or 
legitimacy of the expectations that could potentially be protected by the fair and 
equitable treatment clause. This key point often remains implicit in the 
characterisation of reasonable expectations,81 but in some cases it has indeed been 
spelt out. A line can be identified in this regard going from Methanex v. United 
States, where the tribunal stated that the investor could not ignore the conditions 
of the regulatory and political context prevailing in California and the United 
States,82 to Plama v. Bulgaria, where the tribunal reasoned that a diligent investor 
should have been aware of the debates at the parliament relating to the potential 
changes of the relevant environmental law,83 to Chemtura v. Canada84 and, more 
recently, Occidental v. Ecuador,85 Unglaube v. Costa Rica,86 Copper Mesa v. 
Ecuador 87  and Charanne v. Spain, 88  where the tribunals reasoned that the 
claimants, as sophisticated investors in their respective industries, could not 
reasonably expect that no regulatory changes would intervene during the period 
relevant for their investment.  
The overall import of this line of cases can be summarised in four points. 
Investors have a due diligence obligation, which covers not only (a) the basic 
regulations applicable to foreign investment transactions (e.g. licensing 																																																								
79  Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc A/RES/56/83, 12 
December 2001 (‘ILC Articles’). See Occidental v. Ecuador, above n. 78, para 659ff; Hulley v. Russia, above 
n. 55, para 1274 (referring to chapters X.E and XII.C of the award); Yukos v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1274 
(referring to chapters X.E and XII.C of the award); Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1274 
(referring to chapters X.E and XII.C of the award); Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above n. 56, para 6.91 
(considering Article 39 as ‘declaratory’ of customary international law). 
80  Occidental v. Ecuador, above n. 78, para 678, 681, 687 (quantum); Hulley v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1274 
(referring to chapters X.E and XII.C of the award); Yukos v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1274 (referring to 
chapters X.E and XII.C of the award); Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1274 (referring to 
chapters X.E and XII.C of the award); Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above n. 56, para 6.97 and 6.102 (liability) 
81  LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (13 October 2006) (‘LG&E v. 
Argentina’), para 130; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award 
(11 September 2007), para 331; Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil SA v. Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award (18 August 2008), para 340. 
82  Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award (3 August 2005), part IV, 
chapter D, para 9-10. 
83  Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 2008) (‘Plama v. 
Bulgaria’), para 219-221. 
84  Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award (2 
August 2010), para 149. 
85  Occidental v. Ecuador, above n. 78, para 383. 
86  Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1 and Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of 
Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/20, Award (16 May 2012), para 258. 
87  Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above n. 56, para 6.60-6.71 (although the tribunal concludes that the police powers 
doctrine does not cover the measures challenged for lack of due process). See specifically para 6.61 (‘[i]n the 
Tribunal’s view, as a general matter, the Claimant took the risk of changes in the legal and regulatory regime 
upon making its long-term investments in Ecuador. There were in the present case no specific commitments, 
representations or assurances to the Claimant that the Respondent would refrain from such regulation.’). 
88  Charanne BV and Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, ECT Arbitration 062/2012 (SCC 
Rules), Award (21 January 2016) [Spanish], para 507. 
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requirements and the like) but also (b) the entire legal framework potentially 
applicable to the investment as well as (c) the potential changes of such 
framework that are foreseeable at the time the investment is made. Investors may, 
of course, manage regulatory risk by introducing specific provisions in their 
contract with the host State, but this possibility is not without limits.89 In addition, 
as noted by other investment tribunals, (d) ‘reasonableness’ would have to be 
assessed in the light of other broader circumstances, including ‘business risk or 
industry’s regular patterns’ 90  or ‘the political, socioeconomic, cultural and 
historical conditions prevailing in the host State’.91 By way of illustration, it 
would not be reasonable for an investor investing in highly volatile political 
environment, whatever the assurances received, that the investment will no longer 
be affected by further disruptions.92 In such a context, assumed political risk 
would become commercial risk.  
Moving now to the second perspective, investors’ negligence can be an 
important consideration in assessing a counter-claim brought by a State. A 
noteworthy case in this regard is the pending dispute Perenco v. Ecuador.93 The 
case concerns the environmental impact of oil extraction activities by Perenco in 
the Ecuadorian part of the Amazonian rainforest. In an interim decision on a 
counter-claim brought by Ecuador, the tribunal has discussed Perenco’s liability 
for damage caused to the environment under both strict liability and fault-based 
liability regimes laid out in Ecuadorian law and incorporated into the applicable 
contractual framework without, however, specifying the extent of liability.94 The 
discussion of fault-liability is significant to assess the impact of an investor’s 
‘duty of care’, particularly in the light of best industry practice. In this case, 
Perenco took over the operation of two blocs from a previous operator without a 
proper environmental assessment (at least there was none recorded in writing) of 
the state of the blocs at the time of taking over. The conduct of such an 
assessment is, however, common industry practice because, in case of 
environmental liability, it allows to disentangle what damage is attributable to 
each operator. In assessing Perenco’s liability for the environmental damage of 
the relevant blocs, the tribunal paid attention to this and other displays of 
negligence.95 References to investor’s negligence become even more pressing 
when assessing the investor’s environmental practices. Before reviewing the 
different instances of deficient environmental management, the tribunal states 																																																								
89  OECD Guidelines, above n. 8, chapter II, para 5. 
90  LG&E v. Argentina, above n. 81, para 130. 
91  Duke v. Ecuador, above n. 81, para 340. 
92  See Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A Ş v, Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29, Award (27 August 
2009), para 193 (‘the Tribunal is of the view that the Claimant could not reasonably have ignored the volatility 
of the political conditions prevailing in Pakistan at the time it agreed to the revival of the Contract. Indeed, the 
Claimant expressly acknowledges that it suffered severely from political changes in Pakistan during the 
preceding years’).  
93  Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (11 August 2015). 
94  See the ambiguous formulation of the operative part, ibid., para 611 (points 3 and 4). 
95  Ibid., para 389-390. 
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indeed that ‘given [its] view of Perenco’s conduct [ … ] it has decided not to 
dispose of this claim on a simple burden of proof approach’96 and, later on, it 
notes that ‘[t]he number of non-conformities, including major non-conformities, is 
striking and tends to weaken Perenco’s claim of strong environmental 
stewardship’. 97  Then, after reviewing several specific non-conformities, the 
tribunal concluded that ‘ 
‘the company’s failure to document the environmental condition of the two Blocks at the time of 
acquisition of its interests, its failures to conduct the statutorily required audits in 2004, its use of 
outdates environmental documents during the course of the operations, its failure to obtain 
necessary licenses, the increase in the incidence of nonconformities detected in the 2006 and 2008 
audits, and [a witness’] unchallenged testimony as to the approach taken in the 2008 Block 7 audit 
do not paint a picture of a responsible environmental steward’98 
The decision is peculiar in that it encourages the parties to reach a settlement on 
the basis of its factual findings. The liability of Perenco is strongly suggested but 
the operative part remains ambiguous. This said, the decision is important to 
identify the type of standards that investors are expected to follow, which arise 
not only from domestic law but also from best industry practice. 
2.4.4. Investor diligence and quantum – Another way in which the degree of 
investor diligence has been taken into account is through an adjustment 
(reduction) of compensation. The rationale underlying this approach is that those 
damages arising from investor’s negligence should not be compensated, either 
because such negligence would be (at least partially) their cause or because the 
overall damage could have been mitigated had the investor exercised the diligence 
that could be expected from it. Technically, there are two legal concepts 
mobilised in this regard, namely contributory fault (entailing causality between 
fault and a severable part of the injury suffered) and the duty to mitigate damages. 
Regarding the first concept, contributory fault has been used to reduce 
compensation by 25,99 30100 or even 50101 per cent and, in one case, to suppress 
compensation altogether.102 A line can be identified in this regard going from 
cases such as MTD v. Chile, to Occidental v. Ecuador, the Yukos cases and Al-
Warraq v. Indonesia and, more recently, Copper Mesa v. Ecuador. MTD v. Chile 
is often referred to as a key precedent. In this case, the tribunal considered that the 
investor, which had acted negligently in assessing regulatory risks affecting the 
acquisition of a plot of land for further development, had to bear part of the 
damages that it had suffered. The tribunal reasoned that such damage was 																																																								
96  Ibid., para 407. 
97  Ibid., para 411. 
98  Ibid., para 447. 
99  Occidental v. Ecuador, above n. 78, para 687; Hulley v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1637; Yukos v. Russia, above 
n. 55, para 1637; Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1274. 
100  Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above n. 56, para 6.102. 
101  MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award (25 May 
2004), para 242-243. 
102  Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, above n. 75, para 683, point 6 (for the claim relating to breach of fair and equitable 
treatment). 
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attributable to business risk because the investor could have mitigated it if it had 
deployed better business judgment: 
‘The Tribunal decided earlier that the Claimants incurred costs that were related to their business 
judgment irrespective of the breach of fair and equitable treatment under the BIT. As already 
noted, the Claimants, at the time of their contract with Mr. Fontaine, had made decisions that 
increased their risks in the transaction and for which they bear responsibility, regardless of the 
treatment given by Chile to the Claimants. They accepted to pay a price for the land with the 
Project without appropriate legal protection. A wise investor would not have paid full price up-
front for land valued on the assumption of the realization of the Project; he would at least have 
staged future payments to project progress, including the issuance of the required development 
permits [ … ] The Tribunal considers therefore that the Claimants should bear part of the damages 
suffered and the Tribunal estimates that share to be 50% after deduction of the residual value of 
their investment calculated on the basis of the following considerations.’103 
Interestingly, the key consideration in the reasoning offered by the tribunal is the 
distinction between business judgement, which is a matter of commercial risk, and 
the compensable political risk. As discussed in the next section, this distinction, 
which remains underexplored despite the inflation in writings about investment 
law, is of great importance both theoretically and in practice. Another prominent 
illustration is Occidental v. Ecuador. In this case, the claimant had transferred its 
rights over a portion of an oil block without the required authorisation of the 
government officials. Such conduct enabled the operation of a clause authorising 
the rescinding of the governing contract. The tribunal found that, in the specific 
factual context, the exercise of such contractual right by the governmental 
authority had been disproportionate but it nevertheless reasoned that the investor 
had contributed to this measure as a result of its negligence. For present purposes, 
the main elements that can be derived from this decision are the conditions for the 
operation of Article 39 of the ILC Articles, which the tribunal read in conjunction 
with Article 31. Three main components of this test can be identified namely (i) 
negligence must be of some degree, (ii) it must bear a material or significant 
causal relationship with the challenged measure, and (iii) some part of the injury 
must be shown to be severable in causal terms from the injury caused by the host 
State. 104  The tribunal asserted ‘discretion’ as to the apportionment of the 
damage.105 Subsequent decisions have added some further refinements. In the 
Yukos awards contributory fault was distinguished from the duty to mitigate 
damages106 and in Copper Mesa v. Ecuador the tribunal suggested that when the 
investor’s fault (component (i) of the abovementioned test) goes beyond 
negligence it may have ‘much graver’ consequences.107 																																																								
103  MTD v. Chile, above n. 101, para 242-243. The damages assessment of the tribunal withstood an annulment 
challenge, see MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Decision on 
Annulment (16 February 2007) (‘MTD v. Chile—Annulment’), para 101.  
104  Occidental v. Ecuador, above n. 78, para 665-668. 
105  Ibid., para 670. 
106  Hulley v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1603; Yukos v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1603; Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, 
above n. 55, para 1603. Although the tribunal is not entirely clear on this point, the main dividing line seems to 
be the causal link between the investor’s ‘fault’ and the State’s wrongful act (para 1608) whereas the duty to 
mitigate damages intervenes in the absence of such causal link and after the State’s wrongful act has occurred. 
107  Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, above n. 56, para 6.100.  
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The latter point can be illustrated by reference to the – perhaps exceptional – 
approach followed by the tribunal in Al-Warraq v. Indonesia. In this case, the 
tribunal found that the State had breached its fair and equitable treatment 
obligation under the applicable treaty (imported through an MFN clause) and even 
a provision (Article 14) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, although the tribunal did not assert jurisdiction over this instrument. 
However, because of the reckless financial practices of the investor, which the 
tribunal considered to be in breach of an unusual provision (Article 9) of the 
applicable treaty requiring the investor to comply with domestic regulations, a 
majority of the tribunal concluded that ‘for this reason [the Claimant] is not 
entitled to any damages in respect of the Respondent’s breaches of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard’.108 This is a remarkable development because the 
treaty clause in question, however unusual, simply states what is in all events 
obvious, in essence that investors must respect the domestic laws and regulations 
for the protection of the public interest.109  
Even in the absence of contributory fault, compensation may be reduced as a 
result of the investor’s duty to mitigate the damages suffered. There is an 
abundant body of cases providing authority to the existence of such a duty.110 The 
principle was suitably formulated a case against Slovenia where, discussing 
mitigation, the tribunal noted that ‘general principles of international law 
applicable in this case require an innocent party to act reasonably in attempting to 
mitigate its losses’ and buttressed this assertion with a reference to the 
commentary to Article 31 of the ILC Articles.111 The negligence involved here 
(rejected in casu) relates to the conduct of the aggrieved party when facing the 
wrongful act. That conduct must remain reasonable112 and the burden of proving 
negligence is on the respondent.113 Of note is that the tribunal is assuming – quite 
reasonably – that a duty of mitigation normally applicable to States also applies to 
investors. This is an interesting indication that there may be many other duties 																																																								
108  Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, above n. 75, para 683, point 6. 
109  Specifically, Article 9 of the Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among 
Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, June 1981, states: ‘The investor shall be bound 
by the laws and regulations in force in the host state and shall refrain from all acts that may disturb public order 
or morals or that may be prejudicial to the public interest. He is also to refrain from exercising restrictive 
practices and from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means’. 
110  See Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH v. Republic of Poland, Award (16 October 1995), para 98-102; Middle East 
Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award (12 April 2002), para 
166-171; CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (14 March 2003), para 482-483; 
EDF International SA, SAUR International SA and Leon Participaciones Argentinas SA v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/23, Award (11 June 2012), para 1302-131; Hulley v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1776; Yukos v. 
Russia, above n. 55, para 1776; Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, above n. 55, para 1776; Hrvatska Elektroprivreda 
D.D. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Award (17 December 2015), para 215. 
111  Hrvatska v. Slovenia, above n. 110, para 215, 386. See also EDF v. Argentina, above n. 110, para 1302 
(referring to Article 31 of the ILC Articles); Middle East Cement v. Egypt, above n. 110, para 167. 
112  See also Saar Papier v. Poland, above n. 110, para 98 (implying a duty of due diligence on the investor); CME 
v. Czech Republic, above n. 110, para 482-483; National Grid plc v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/[---], 
Award (3 November 2008), para 273; EDF v. Argentina, above n. 110, para 1306; Achmea B.V. v. Slovak 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award (7 December 2012), para 320. 
113  Saar Papier v. Poland, above n. 110, para 101. 
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that, through analogical reasoning, could be extended to govern the conduct of 
investors. One illustration of the effects of the duty to mitigate – and how far its 
effects can go – is provided by EDF v. Argentina. In this case, the tribunal 
considered that the investor (EDFI) had failed to its duty to mitigate damage 
because in selling its shares in the investment vehicle to another shareholder, it 
kept only its claims in the arbitration and left any possible benefit from a 
successful renegotiation of the tariff to the buyer of the shares.114 As a result, the 
tribunal concluded that an amount equal to 50% of the value of EDFI participation 
in the vehicle had to be subtracted from the damages awarded.115 
The concepts reviewed in the foregoing sections provide different entry 
points capable of integrating the degree of investor diligence or lack thereof in 
investment proceedings. These instruments have to be assessed in the broader 
light of the other sources discussed in prior sections. Their combined operation is 
relevant in both practical and more theoretical terms, as discussed next. 
3. Concluding observations - Implications of analysing investor diligence in 
investment arbitration 
The analytical exercise conducted in the preceding sections may strike some as 
descriptive ‘black letter’ analysis. That is correct, but precisely because of its 
technical grounding, some very practical implications can be derived; practical 
implications with deeper theoretical roots. These concluding observations look at 
these implications, organised at three levels, from the more theoretical to the more 
practical, namely the implications (i) for the investor-State asymmetry arising 
from international investment agreements, which only contemplate obligations for 
States, (ii) for the still underexplored legal distinction between commercial and 
political risk, particularly for regulated industries, and (iii) for the operation of an 
apparently narrow, yet practically fundamental, concept of international 
investment law, the much debated ‘legitimate expectations’ under the fair and 
equitable (FET) standard. 
3.1. Implications for investor-State asymmetry – There is a body of policy – 
in some cases activist – literature decrying a system of investment protection 
where States only have obligations and investors only have rights. There is some 
truth in such criticism, although from a conceptual perspective it tends to be rather 
simplistic and not always accurate. One must make two important adjustments in 
this regard.  
Firstly, it is not true that investors do not have any obligations. The sources of 
foreign investment regulation are not merely treaties but also a wide array of 
domestic norms, contractual arrangements and an evolving body of customary and 
treaty-based international norms concerning matters such as corruption, social 																																																								
114  EDF v. Argentina, above n. 110, para 1307-1310. 
115  Ibid., para 1312. 
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rights, human (including collective) rights and environmental protection. 116 
Overreliance on IIA in both commentary and – as a result – practice may be 
comfortable, as it allows to excluding significant parcels of knowledge from the 
analysis, but it comes at a price, even for those highly critical of the investment 
protection system. In fairness, if one takes into account at the very least domestic 
law and contractual arrangements, it is inaccurate to state that the investment 
protection system does not impose obligations on investors. In point of fact, it is 
the overreliance on IIA that has led to some ‘practices’ that, in turn, have tended 
to insulate, on thin legal grounds, investors from their obligations. Some of them 
include the distinction between treaty and contract claims, which opens the 
possibility for an investor to exclude its contractual obligations (including a forum 
selection clause) from an investment arbitration proceeding, or the still poorly 
articulated relationship between domestic law and international law (narrowly 
understood as investment treaties), which also serves to downplay the impact of 
the former to the benefit of the latter. It is therefore a practice, a mindset, shared 
even by those who criticise the system, which contributes to the impression that 
investors have no obligations under the system of investment protection.  
The second adjustment is that, technically speaking, investors do not have 
‘rights’. The content of investment protection standards is similar to that of some 
human or constitutional rights, but technically such standards remain inter-State 
disciplines. This is not a merely academic point. To mention but one practical 
implication, a State may well suspend the advantages granted to the investors of 
the other contracting State on the basis of the exceptio non adimplenti contractus 
(Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties117). This is because 
investment treaties are inherently synallagmatic agreements.118  If investment 
disciplines were to be analysed instead as human rights, then such suspension 
would not be lawful. Criticism of the investment protection system has hence 																																																								
116  Viñuales, above n. 5. 
117  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (‘VCLT’) 
118  See e.g. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, para 33 
(‘When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic 
persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the 
treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, 
an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community 
as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection.’(italics added);  
Sawhoyamaxa indigenous community c. Paraguay, ICtHR Series C No 146 (29 March 2006), paras 136, 137, 
140 (‘The State has put forth three arguments: [ … ] 3) that the owner’s right “is protected under a bilateral 
agreement between Paraguay and Germany[,] which [...] has become part of the law of the land [ … ] Lastly, 
with regard to the third argument put forth by the State, the Court has not been furnished with the 
aforementioned treaty between Germany and Paraguay, but, according to the State, said convention allows for 
capital investments made by a contracting party to be condemned or nationalized for a “public purpose or 
interest”, which could justify land restitution to indigenous people. Moreover, the Court considers that the 
enforcement of bilateral commercial treaties negates vindication of non-compliance with state obligations 
under the American Convention; on the contrary, their enforcement should always be compatible with the 
American Convention, which is a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own and that 
generates rights for individual human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among States’(italics 
added)). 
 
 
Jorge E. Viñuales, ‘Investor diligence in investment arbitration: Sources and arguments’ (2017) 32(3) ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, forthcoming 2017. 
 	
been quite uncritical by implying, even conceding, that investors have ‘rights’ 
under current arrangements.  
Once these two adjustments have been made, the unease does not dissipate 
entirely, however. The investment protection system, as it has operated in 
practice, may still appear unbalanced. The policy question that arises at this stage 
is whether introducing internationally imposed obligations on investors would be 
the best avenue to balance the system. In my view, such an approach would be not 
only politically very difficult, but in addition it would not provide an adequate 
response to the root cause of asymmetry, namely the simplistic overreliance on 
investment treaties. In fact, it would further emphasise such overreliance, as it 
would imply that any reform must take place at the IIA level. Instead, a change of 
mindset is necessary, one in which reliance on investment treaties is of course 
preserved but as part of a wider array of sources of foreign investment regulation; 
and one in which these different sources, including treaties, are interpreted in a 
more balanced manner, taking into account the degree of diligence displayed by 
foreign investors. 
3.2. Investor diligence and commercial/political risk – The degree of 
diligence displayed by an investor is very important to determine what must be 
considered as part of its business or commercial risk and what belongs instead to 
political risk. I mentioned earlier the case of MTD v. Chile, where such a 
distinction led to a reduction of 50% in the compensation due to the investor.  
But the distinction has far deeper implications. In a well known statement, an 
investment tribunal ‘emphasize[d] that Bilateral Investment Treaties are not 
insurance policies against bad business judgments’.119 Part of what could be 
characterised as ‘bad’ business judgment includes insufficiently informed 
decisions or negligently assumed risks. Even when the investor has done its 
utmost to behave diligently, part of its losses may still be due to the ‘business risk 
inherent in any investment’.120 A fortiori, when it has not displayed the necessary 
diligence, the consequences of its negligence are relevant to characterise loss as 
part of its commercial risk. 
A particularly complex scenario arises in the context of regulated industries 
and, more specifically, of industries where the market in which the investor 
operates has been created or heavily relies on regulatory conditions. In such a 
case, the benefit of the investment is not generated by market conditions under the 
oversight of the host State but, instead, it is derived from the very regulatory 
framework. An illustration will help clarify this point. Much like an investor in 
the consumer goods industry is expected to assess and monitor consumer 
preferences and choices as part of its business model, an investor in the chemical 
sector would be expected to understand that the scientific understanding of the 
impact of different chemical compounds evolves and that such changes may also 																																																								
119  Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (13 November 2000), para. 64. 
120  Ibid., para 64 in fine. 
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entail regulatory changes. If any adverse change in the regulatory framework 
could be argued to be the compensable consequences of political risk, then there 
would be little or no place for the commercial risk of the investor in the chemical 
sector. Regulatory change must, however, take place within certain reasonable 
bounds to be an acceptable exercise of the States regulatory powers.121 Egregious, 
arbitrary or unreasonable changes should remain actionable as a matter of political 
risk. But there is significant room for changes in the conditions of regulated 
markets that the investor is expected to assess and anticipate, as part of its 
business judgment, which includes the exercise of due diligence. Absent such 
diligence, the ability for an investor to invoke the impairment or frustration of its 
‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’ expectations should be extremely limited. As 
discussed above, the connection between investors’ diligence and legitimate 
expectations is of particular practical importance.  
3.3. Investor diligence and legitimate expectations122 - From a more concrete 
perspective, the degree of investor diligence is not just a question among many 
others. In order to understand this point it is important to recall what was 
mentioned in the previous sub-section as well as in sub-section 2.4.3 above, 
namely that the degree of investor diligence is very important to assess the 
‘reasonableness’ or ‘legitimacy’ of investors’ expectations.  
The significance of this point must be appreciated in the light of the broader 
context of investment arbitration and particularly the relatively recent shift from 
the use of expropriation clauses as the main ground for investment claims to the 
use of other investment treatment standards.123 Unlike expropriation measures, the 
compensation of which is governed by relatively well settled rules of international 
law, the shift towards claims based on standards other than expropriation raised 
the question of how to compensate them or, in other words, what norms govern 
the determination of compensation in such cases. The question is important 
because non-expropriatory breaches of international investment law may be more 
easily established than expropriation. One key requirement in this respect is the 
need to prove, in a claim for indirect expropriation, that the measure challenged 
has led to a substantial deprivation of the value of the investment. Absent 
substantial deprivation, there will be no expropriation. Yet, the measure may still 
be challenged as a breach of the FET standard, particularly as a measure 
frustrating reasonable or legitimate expectations.124  
In the context of the NAFTA, the price for moving away from expropriation 
and to the international minimum standard of treatment (Article 1105) was that 																																																								
121  See generally Viñuales, above n. 1, chapter 14. 
122  See generally ibid. 
123  M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn. 2004), at 
315. 
124  For examples of cases where the tribunals rejected the claim for expropriation and granted the claim for breach 
of the FET standard see P.-Y. Tschanz and Jorge E. Viñuales, ‘Compensation for Non-Expropriatory Breaches 
of International Investment Law: The Contribution of the Argentine Awards’ (2009) 26 Journal of International 
Arbitration 729, Appendix I. 
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the investor could no longer avail itself of the generous and comprehensive rules 
of compensation for expropriation.125	The same point was made beyond the 
NAFTA context by the tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina, in connection with the 
assessment of compensation for a breach of the FET standard in the absence of 
expropriation.126 However, in a stream of cases starting with CMS v. Argentina, 127 
the rules of compensation for expropriation were extended to breaches of FET 
short of expropriation. In other words, breaches of an investment standard such as 
FET, which is not subject to the requirement of substantial deprivation of the 
value of the investment, could be compensated applying the rules of 
compensation for expropriation. 
Against this background, it is easier to understand why the mainstreaming of 
investor diligence as a way of keeping the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
within reasonable bounds may be so significant in practice. If claims for breach of 
the FET standard and, specifically, under the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
can be more easily proved than expropriation (because they are not subject to the 
requirement of ‘substantial deprivation’) and yet be compensated in application of 
the rules normally applicable to expropriation, then taming such a doctrine 
through reference to investor diligence can close a critical loophole in the overall 
law of investment protection. Thus, from a very theoretical to a very practical 
level, it is important to understand the sources and arguments relating to investor 
diligence in international investment proceedings.  
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